Governance
The Political Effects of Programmatic Development Policy: Can Bihar Break the Clientelist Trap?
30 September, 2016
- IGC Research on India
This project aims to understand the conditions of supporting the continuation and expansion of programmatic governance in Bihar state. Bihar’s "clientelism trap" (incentives to return to clientelist governance) still threatens to stall the state’s remarkable institutional and growth progress. To understand the conditions under which this trap can be overcome – and programmatic politics becomes self-sustaining – the findings from the project generated evidences on how Bihari citizens’ relationship with government has changed after a decade of reform.
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