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Jonathan Lehne
Jonathan Lehne is a Ph.D student at the Paris School of Economics. He previously worked as a Research Analyst in the Office of the Chief Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. His research focuses on political economy and development, in particular the economics of corruption.
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Bidding for Roads
The project looks into the mechanisms of political influence by analyzing whether contractors without political connections are deterred from applying, or whether the evaluation process is biased in favor of those with connections. The project exploits political shocks, such as a politician winning an election, to identify how politicians manipulate the road bidding process.
Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India
Rural infrastructure programmes of the government create new opportunities for growth but also for corruption. This column studies India’s flagship rural road construction programme and finds evidence that local politicians favour members of their caste or kinship networks in the allocation of contracts. This raises construction costs, adversely affects road quality, and increases the likelihood of ‘missing’ roads.