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Marianne Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand is the Chris P. Dialynas Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. She is a Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), and the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Professor Bertrand is an applied micro-economist whose research covers the fields of labour economics, corporate finance, and development economics. Her research in these areas has been published widely, including numerous research articles in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Political Economy, the American Economic Review, and the Journal of Finance. She is Faculty Director of Chicago Booth’s Rustandy Center for Social Sector Innovation and the Faculty Director of the Poverty Lab at the University of Chicago Urban Labs. She also serves as co-editor of the American Economic Review.
She has received several awards and honors, including the 2004 Elaine Bennett Research Prize, awarded by the American Economic Association to recognise and honour outstanding research in any field of economics by a woman at the beginning of her career, and the 2012 Society of Labor Economists’ Rosen Prize for Outstanding Contributions to Labor Economics. She is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Born in Belgium, Professor Bertrand received a Bachelor's Degree in economics from Belgium's Universite Libre de Bruxelles in 1991, followed by a Master's Degree in econometrics from the same institution the next year. She moved to the US in 1993 and earned a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University in 1998. She was a faculty member in the Department of Economics at Princeton University for two years before joining Chicago Booth in 2000.
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Should civil servants be allowed to serve in their home areas?
Bureaucrats form an essential part of State capacity. Should they be allowed to serve in their home areas? This article finds that Indian Administrative Service officers assigned to their home states perform worse than comparable officers assigned to non-home states, are perceived to be more corrupt and less able to withstand illegitimate political pressure. This performance gap is particularly pronounced in the later career stages when there is more room for patronage and capture of bureaucracy by local political elite.
Contract labour and firm growth in India
There is considerable evidence indicating that the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), 1947 – which made it illegal for large companies to downsize – had a powerful disincentive effect for entrepreneurs in India. Using Annual Survey of Industries data, this article shows that constraints on large firms diminished since the early 2000s largely due to exploitation of a loophole pertaining to contract labour, rather than a de jure change in the labour laws.