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Oliver Eynde
Oliver Vanden Eynde is an Assistant Professor at Paris School of Economics. He was visiting Associate Research Scholar, Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) at Princeton University in 2013-14. His research focuses on civil conflict, crime, and the role of the military in developing countries. He has worked on the human capital effects of military recruitment in colonial India, the design of civil-military institutions, and the targeting strategies of insurgents in India’s Maoist conflict. Current research projects explore the relationship between political change and crime reduction in India, the impact of infrastructure development in conflict zones, and the public finance of conflict. He obtained his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics in 2012.
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Rural infrastructure provision in India: mapping the Bharat Nirman programme
This project introduces a unique, integrated dataset on Maoist activity, three flagship programmes for rural infrastructure development (PMGSY,RGGVY, and USOF), and a dedicated programme targeted at India’s Left Wing Extremism (LWE) regions. The project findings reveal that Maoist affected villages were not targeted differentially for the flagship programmes but did attract more Integrated Action Plan (IAP) projects.
Political Change and Crime Reduction in Bihar
The aim of this project was to understand the mechanisms through which the political changes in 2005 contributed to the dramatic subsequent reduction in violent crimes. This project is an extension of the previous project on 'Political change and crime reduction in Bihar'. This study finds out the role the role of infrastructure construction in the concomitant crime reduction and surge in economic growth, in parallel, or in conjunction with policing efforts. The findings of this project provide a unique perspective on the dynamics and factors of law and order and economic growth in Bihar over the last 15 years.
Bidding for roads
This project aims to understand how to make it harder for local politicians to capture small-scale infrastructure projects. In the context of the bidding process for contracts under India’s flagship rural road construction programme, it examines three questions:
Bidding for Roads
The project looks into the mechanisms of political influence by analyzing whether contractors without political connections are deterred from applying, or whether the evaluation process is biased in favor of those with connections. The project exploits political shocks, such as a politician winning an election, to identify how politicians manipulate the road bidding process.
Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India
Rural infrastructure programmes of the government create new opportunities for growth but also for corruption. This column studies India’s flagship rural road construction programme and finds evidence that local politicians favour members of their caste or kinship networks in the allocation of contracts. This raises construction costs, adversely affects road quality, and increases the likelihood of ‘missing’ roads.
Connecting the red corridor: Infrastructure provision in conflict areas
The government’s efforts to develop rural infrastructure have been particularly intense in the 90-odd districts that are affected by Maoism. How successful has the implementation of flagship infrastructure programmes been in these areas? This column finds that disruption of programmes by Maoists, as reported by newspapers, is not nearly as pervasive as one might think.
Connecting the Red Corridor: Infrastructure Provision in Conflict Zones
This project introduces a unique, integrated dataset on Maoist activity, three flagship programmes for rural infrastructure development (PMGSY, RGGVY, and USOF), and a dedicated programme targeted at India’s Left Wing Extremism (LWE) regions.