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Ram Singh
Ram Singh is Professor at the Delhi School of Economics (DSE), University of Delhi. He holds Ph.D. (JNU, New Delhi) and Post-Doctorate (Harvard) degrees in economics. His areas of research interests are contract theory, public economics, public private partnerships, and law and economics. He is a recipient of Fulbright, Commonwealth, and Erasmus Mundus Fellowships in economics Ronald Coase Fellowships in economics. His recent publications include “The Inefficiency of Compulsory Land Acquisition” in the Economic and Political Weekly, 2012; “The Efficiency of Comparative Causation” (with Francesco Parisi) in the Review of Law and Economics 2011; “Delays and Cost Overruns in Infrastructure Projects: Extents, Causes and Remedies” in the Economic and Political Weekly, 2010; “Comparative Vigilance” (with Allan Feldman), in the American Law and Economics Review, 2009.
He has taught at the DSE, Brown University, University of Hamburg, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and has been Commonwealth Fellow at the London School of Economics. He is Co-editor of the Indian Economic Review.
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Covid-19: Dealing with the economic consequences
In the last two weeks, the Covid-19 pandemic has turned the world economy upside down, and all indicators point to one of the sharpest economic contractions in modern times. In this post, Ram Singh discusses the hard choices that lie ahead for India, and what government interventions are required to prevent the shock from turning a slowdown into a depression.
The new land law: Are the states up to the challenge?
In the third part of the land law debate, Ram Singh asserts that the Act is biased against projects of state governments, and emphasises the need for states to undertake long overdue land reforms. He suggests amending the Act such that Public Private Partnerships and private companies are clearly distinguished, and there is no scope for strategic manipulations during the acquisition process.
Does choice of procurement contract matter for cost and quality of highways?
In the past, infrastructure projects in India have suffered from long delays, massive cost overruns, and poor quality of assets. A widely held belief is that public private partnerships (PPPs) can solve these problems. To examine this claim, this article compares the performance of PPPs with traditionally procured highway projects. It finds that project delivery is faster but construction costs are significantly higher for PPPs than for non-PPP roads. Moreover, quality of road surface is better for the former compared to the latter.
Does choice of procurement contract matter for cost and quality of infrastructure?
Central as well as state governments in India lack financial resources and expertise needed to provide adequate infrastructure and maintain it. To augment their capacity and effectiveness, government agencies have been resorting to private funding and management of infrastructure services through the public private partnerships, under which private partners are required to fund the project and maintain it during operational phase.