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Simon Chauchard
Simon Chauchard is a Lecturer in Discipline in Comparative Politics at the School of Public and International Affairs, Columbia University. His research focuses on ethnic politics, voting behaviour, political representation and politicians-citizens relations in India. Recent works have appeared in Political Opinion Quarterly, the American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, and Asian Survey. His book, titled Why Representation Matters: The Meaning of Ethnic Quotas in Rural India (Cambridge University Press), combines qualitative work and a series of innovative surveys to explore the impact of caste-based reservation policies on everyday inter-group relations in India’s villages. Ongoing projects rely on qualitative, quantitative and experimental methodologies to explore political brokerage and the role that money and other forms of influence play in Indian elections.
Website: simonchauchard.com
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क्या भारतीय मतदाताओं को अपने प्रतिनिधियों के कार्यालय में रहते हुए उनकी संपत्ति में वृद्धि होता देख फर्क पड़ता है?
राजनेताओं के लिए वित्तीय सूचनाओं की जानकारी देने की आवश्यकता के तहत अपनी परिसंपत्तियों की घोषणाएं करना पूरी दुनिया में आम बात होती जा रही है। भारत में वित्तीय घोषणाएं राजनीतिक पद के लिए उम्मीदवारी की पूर्वशर्त के बतौर दाखिल किए जाने वाले सार्वजनिक शपथपत्र का हिस्सा होती हैं। प्रयोग और सर्वेक्षण के मूल आंकड़ों के साथ भारतीय शपथपत्रों से प्राप्त आंकड़ों का उपयोग करके इस आलेख में जांच की गई है कि राजनेताओं द्वारा धन-संपत्ति संचय से संबंधित सूचनाएं नागरिकों द्वारा राजनेताओं के मूल्यांकन और मतदान संबंधी उनके अपने व्यवहार को कैसे प्रभावित कर सकती हैं।
Do Indian voters mind their representatives getting rich in office?
Asset declarations, requiring politicians to disclose their financial information, are becoming increasingly common across the world. In India, financial declarations are part of public affidavits filed as a prerequisite for candidacy for political office. Using data from Indian affidavits, along with original experimental and survey data, this article examines how information on politicians' wealth accumulation may impact citizens’ evaluations of politicians and their voting behaviour.
The strategic logic of money flows in Indian elections
Why do political candidates give voters handouts during election campaigns, even when they are unable to monitor voter behaviour? Based on a qualitative study in Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons: candidates expect opponents to distribute handouts and hence do so themselves to split votes of handout-reactive voters – rather than to attempt to ‘buy’ votes per se.