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Rajesh Raj S.N.
Dr. Rajesh Raj S.N. is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, Sikkim University, India. He received a Ph.D. in economics from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras, India. His main research interests include industrial economics, firm dynamics, efficiency and productivity analysis, and informal labour. His publications include articles in academic journals (Small Business Economics, Journal of Comparative Economics, Manchester School, International Journal of Educational Development, Oxford Development Studies, European Journal of Development Research, Developing Economies, and others), numerous chapters in edited volumes, and the book 'Out of the Shadows? The Informal Manufacturing in Post-Reform India', co-authored with Kunal Sen (Oxford University Press). He is also the author of the book 'Small Firm Ownership and Credit Constraints in India' (forthcoming), published by Routledge. He is the recipient of the Dr. VKRV Rao Prize in Economics for the year 2014 by the ISEC (Institute for Social and Economic Change), Bangalore, and ICSSR (Indian Council of Social Science Research), New Delhi.
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‘मेक इन इंडिया’ में अवरोध
वर्तमान सरकार ने, सीमित सफलता के साथ, वर्ल्ड बैंक के डूइंग बिजनेस संकेतकों में भारत की रैंकिंग को सुधारने का प्रयास किया है। यह लेख बताता है कि राज्य और कारोबारों के बीच 'सौदे' - नियमों के बजाय - राज्य-व्यापार संबंध का विवरण प्रस्तुत करते हैं। कमजोर गुणवत्ता शासन वाले भारतीय राज्यों में लाइसेंस प्राप्त करने की गति के मामले में 'अच्छे सौदों’ का अनुपात अधिक है। इसी प्रकार आवश्यक नहीं है कि कारोबार नियमों को आसान बनाने से उच्च उत्पादकता प्राप्त हो।
Unmaking ‘Make in India’
The current government has attempted to improve India’s ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators, but with limited success. This article shows that ‘deals’ between the State and businesses, rather than the rules laid out by the State, characterise the State–business relationship. Indian states with weaker quality of governance provide higher proportions of ‘good deals’ in terms of the speed of obtaining licences, such that easing business regulations does not necessarily lead to higher productivity