.svg){kind=icon}
.svg){kind=icon}
%201.svg){kind=icon}
%201.svg){kind=icon}
.svg){kind=icon}
.svg)
.svg)
Sabyasachi Kar
Sabyasachi Kar is the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Chair Professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), and an Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the University of Manchester, UK. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research spans macroeconomics, economic growth, development economics, and political economy, with a particular focus on the Indian economy. He is currently a researcher with the ESID (Effective States for Inclusive Development) growth consortium based at the University of Manchester, and a Research Partner of the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) Global Poverty and Inequality Dynamics (GPID) research network based at the King's College, London. He is a co-editor of the Journal of South Asian Development (Sage, India), and Associate Editor of the Indian Growth and Development Review (Emerald, UK). Professor Kar has provided inputs for successive five-year plans in India to the Perspective Planning Division of the erstwhile Indian Planning Commission, and worked on projects sponsored by the World Bank, the Global Development Network (GDN), the European Commission, and the Department for International Development (DFID), UK. His latest book, entitled, 'The Political Economy of India's Growth Episodes', has been published by Palgrave Macmillan, UK, in 2016.
.svg)
‘मेक इन इंडिया’ में अवरोध
वर्तमान सरकार ने, सीमित सफलता के साथ, वर्ल्ड बैंक के डूइंग बिजनेस संकेतकों में भारत की रैंकिंग को सुधारने का प्रयास किया है। यह लेख बताता है कि राज्य और कारोबारों के बीच 'सौदे' - नियमों के बजाय - राज्य-व्यापार संबंध का विवरण प्रस्तुत करते हैं। कमजोर गुणवत्ता शासन वाले भारतीय राज्यों में लाइसेंस प्राप्त करने की गति के मामले में 'अच्छे सौदों’ का अनुपात अधिक है। इसी प्रकार आवश्यक नहीं है कि कारोबार नियमों को आसान बनाने से उच्च उत्पादकता प्राप्त हो।
Unmaking ‘Make in India’
The current government has attempted to improve India’s ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators, but with limited success. This article shows that ‘deals’ between the State and businesses, rather than the rules laid out by the State, characterise the State–business relationship. Indian states with weaker quality of governance provide higher proportions of ‘good deals’ in terms of the speed of obtaining licences, such that easing business regulations does not necessarily lead to higher productivity